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In this study we aimed to investigate how awareness of bodily responses, referred to
as interoceptive awareness, inﬂuences decision-making in a social interactive context.
Interoceptive awareness is thought to be crucial for adequate regulation of one’s emotions.
However, there is a dearth of studies that examine the association between interoceptive
awareness and the ability to regulate emotions during interpersonal decision-making. Here,
we quantiﬁed interoceptive awareness with a heartbeat detection task in which we mea-
sured the difference between subjective self-reports and an objective psychophysiological
measurement of participant heart rates. Social decision-makingwas quantiﬁed using a two-
round Ultimatum Game. Participants were asked to ﬁrst reject or accept an unfair division
of money proposed by a partner. In turn, participants could then make an offer on how
to divide an amount of money with the same partner. Participants performed 20 rounds
of the two-round Ultimatum Game twice, once during baseline condition and once while
asked to reappraise emotional reactions when confronted with unfair offers from partners.
Results showed that after reappraisal participants (1) accepted more unfair offers and (2)
offered higher return divisions, as compared to baseline. With respect to interoceptive
awareness, participants with better heartbeat detection scores tended to report less
emotional involvement when they applied reappraisal while playing the Ultimatum Game.
However, therewas no reliably signiﬁcant relationship between heartbeat detection and the
acceptance of unfair offers. Similarly, heartbeat detection accuracywas not related to return
offers made in the second round of the Ultimatum Game or the habitual use of emotion
regulation. These preliminary ﬁndings suggest that the relationship between interoceptive
awareness and behavioral changes due to emotion regulation in a social decision-making
context appears to be complex.
Keywords: interoceptive awareness, decision-making, social, unfairness, regulation, emotion, Ultimatum Game,
reappraisal
INTRODUCTION
Recently there has been increasing attention towards the role of
affective responses when people make strategic decisions in inter-
personal contexts. Decision-making in a social interactive context
has been particularly well-studied in a well-known game known as
the Ultimatum Game (Guth et al., 1982). In the Ultimatum Game
two people are asked to divide a certain amount of money. The
ﬁrst player makes a proposal of how to split the money in any
way she likes. The second player then has to make a choice. She
can accept the division of money in which case the money is split
as proposed by the ﬁrst player. The alternative is that she rejects
the division in which case neither player receives any money. In
this scenario a “rational” second player who solely cares about the
money will accept any offer (as something is more than nothing),
and the ﬁrst player, realizing this, will offer as little as possible.
However, in actuality second players typically reject 50% of unfair
offers that are 20% or less of the total money amount to be divided
(Camerer, 2003).
It has been proposed that this rejection of unfair offers reﬂects
the importance that people place on fairness and punishment
associated with being treated unfairly (Fehr and Gachter, 2002).
For instance, the (negative) emotional reactions to unfair offers
might be a robust reason why people reject these offers (Pillutla
and Murnighan, 1996). A neuroimaging study in which people
were playing in the role of second player while being scanned
showed that activation of the insula was predictive of subsequent
rejection of unfair offers (Sanfey et al., 2003). Activation of the
insula has been associated with feelings of disgust (Phillips et al.,
1997) and (negative) arousal in general (Kuhnen and Knutson,
2005; Nitschke et al., 2006; Nielen et al., 2009; Caria et al., 2010).
This lead to the suggestion that insula activation in response to
the to-be-rejected unfair offers reﬂects negative emotional feeling
states associatedwithunfair treatment (Sanfey et al., 2003). Studies
that use psychophysiological methods, such as skin conductance
responses or heart beat variability, to directly quantify (emotional)
arousal have replicated the relationship of higher (emotional)
arousal and a tendency to subsequently reject unfair offers (van
’t Wout et al., 2006; Osumi and Ohira, 2009). These ﬁndings are
consistent with the idea behind the somatic marker theory, which
proposes that arousal-based bodily signals can guide decision-
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making (Damasio, 1994; Damasio et al., 1996). In his early work,
James (1884) already highlighted the importance of awareness of
bodily changes in response to stimuli for the generation of an
emotional experience.
Interestingly there is variability between people in how likely
they are to reject an unfair offer, ranging from those who reject
every offer that is not an equal split, to those who never reject
any non-zero offer. The decision to accept has been associated
with the implementation of cognitive strategies frequently aimed
to reduce negative emotional arousal, i.e., emotion regulation (van
’t Wout et al., 2010). More speciﬁcally, emotion regulation refers
to a diverse set of cognitive processes by which “individuals inﬂu-
ence which emotions they have, when they have them, and how
they experience and express these emotions” (c.f. Gross, 1998). In
the study by van ’t Wout et al. (2010) participants accepted more
unfair offers when asked to reappraise their emotions in response
to unfair offers that were 20% or less of the total sum as compared
to when they were not reappraising or using suppression as a reg-
ulatory strategy. Given that we often interact multiple times with
the same person, we had adapted the Ultimatum Game to allow
examining whether after reappraisal people were also less likely to
retaliate, i.e., to propose a similar unfair offer in return. Our data
showed that, after reappraisal, people proposed a fairer split when
they were able to divide a sum of money with a partner even after
this same partner had treated them unfairly previously. Yet we
also noted that there were individual differences in how successful
people were at reappraising their emotions.
An important prerequisite for successful emotion regulation
is interoceptive awareness. Interoceptive awareness is the aware-
ness of bodily signals and has been highlighted as important
in many early theories of emotion (James, 1884; Schachter and
Singer, 1962). Füstös et al. (2012) report that interoceptive aware-
ness facilitated the use of reappraisal as an emotional regulation
strategy to decrease subjective negative affect and electrophysio-
logical responses associated with emotion regulation (P3 and slow
wave). Other studies have validated the presence of an association
between interoceptive awareness and emotion arousal (Pollatos
et al., 2005), emotion processing, and activation of the insula
(Craig, 2002, 2003, 2004; Critchley et al., 2004; Pollatos et al.,
2007a), the same region that was predictive of rejecting unfair
offers in the Ultimatum Game. Interestingly, Kirk et al. (2011)
showed that experienced Buddhist meditators accept the most
unfair offers (i.e., 5 and 10% of total sum) more often than con-
trol participants. Compared to controls, meditators displayed a
different neural activation pattern associated with interoception,
including the (posterior) insula. Whether interoception is related
to Ultimatum Game behavior was more directly examined by
Dunn et al. (2012). In their study, Dunn et al. (2012) demon-
strated that as interoceptive abilities increase, people reported
more anger in response tounfair offers and found these offersmore
unfair. Moreover, those with better interoceptive ability showed a
larger difference in psychophysiological arousal, i.e., skin conduc-
tance, to rejected relative to accepted offers. This difference in
arousal further predicted higher rejection rates in people with bet-
ter interoception, but this relationship was absent for people with
poorer interoception. These data were interpreted as being consis-
tent with emotion regulation explanations for rejection decisions
in the Ultimatum Game. However, emotion regulation was not
explicitly measured in the study by Dunn et al. (2012). Examining
whether people with better interoceptive ability are better at apply-
ing emotion regulation when confronted with unfair offers in the
Ultimatum Game might provide more insight into the relation-
ship between emotion regulation, interoception, and reactions to
unfair treatment. Moreover, there is no investigation on whether
interoceptive ability inﬂuences Ultimatum Game behavior when
interacting with the same person for a second time (who may have
been unfair the ﬁrst time).
In this study, we directly wanted to test whether there is a rela-
tionship between interoceptive ability and the ability to apply
emotion regulation, i.e., reappraisal, when treated unfairly by
others in the Ultimatum Game. In addition, we were interested
in testing whether there is a relationship between interoceptive
awareness and emotion regulation ability when proposing offers
to others who previously had treated them unfairly in the Ultima-
tum Game. In the experiment, we opted for the use of reappraisal
as a regulatory strategy. During reappraisal, people actively try
to rework the meaning of emotion-inducing situations, and it
has been shown to be effective in lowering emotional experi-
ence and reducing the associated psychophysiological processes,
such as heart rate, skin conductance responses, and neural activity
(Gross, 2002; Ochsner et al., 2002; Gross and John, 2003; Goldin
et al., 2008). Moreover, in our previous study on regulation during
the Ultimatum Game, reappraisal seemed to be most effective in
inﬂuencing decision-making (van ’t Wout et al., 2010). We pre-
dicted that people who are better at (interoceptively) accessing
their bodily signals would accept more unfair offers proposed
by others and would be less emotionally involved during reg-
ulation as compared to baseline. This was based on the above
mentioned research showing (1) the importance of interocep-
tive awareness for successful emotion regulation (Füstös et al.,
2012), and (2) that those who typically are better regulators, i.e.,
meditators, accept more unfair offers and show neural patterns
indicative of interoception (Kirk et al., 2011). Our hypotheses
with respect to an association between interoceptive awareness
and proposal behavior in the Ultimatum Game while applying
emotion regulation as compared to baseline were exploratory.
A potential positive correlation between interoceptive awareness
and proposed offers in the second round after regulating (as
compared to baseline) suggests that people with better intero-
ceptive awareness are better at limiting the inﬂuence of negative
feelings from the ﬁrst encounter on behavior during a second
interaction. We measured interoceptive awareness using a heart-
beat detection task in which we computed the difference between
subjective self-report and an objective psychophysiological mea-
surement of one’s heart rate (Schandry, 1981). Second, we tested
the exploratory hypothesis of a positive relationship between
the self-report habitual use of reappraisal and interoceptive
awareness.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty three healthy people aged 18–46, mean age 25.36 years
(SD 6.85), 23 females were recruited from the general and Brown
University community and participated in the study. The Mini
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International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI, Sheehan et al.,
1998) was used to conﬁrm the absence of current psychological
illnesses or the use of any psychotropic medication. In addi-
tion to the MINI, we administered the Beck Depression Inventory
(Beck et al., 1988) and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (Fydrich et al.,
1992) to measure self-reported levels of depression and anxiety.
The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ: Gross and John,
2003) was also administered to examine self-reported levels of the
habitual use of suppression and reappraisal as emotion regulatory
strategies.
Out of these 33participants, oneparticipant demonstratedhigh
scores on the BDI and BAI indicative of moderate depression and
severe anxiety. In addition, two participants provided dubious
answers on questionnaires (i.e., answered every question on the
questionnaire with the same response which led to serious doubt
about task performance). Due to software malfunctioning, we lack
data on heartbeat detection for two participants. This resulted in
a group of 30 participants for Ultimatum Game data analyses
and a group of 28 participants for analyses regarding heartbeat
detection.
The order of task administration was ﬁxed and started with
the MINI, after which participants played the Ultimatum Game,
performed the interoception task, and completed the ques-
tionnaires. The study was conducted in a quiet room at the
Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences Department,
Brown University. Except for the MINI, all tasks were admin-
istered on a computer. Participants were compensated for their
time and earned some additional money based on their per-
formance on the Ultimatum Game (see below for details). The
local ethics committee approved the study and all participants
provided written informed consent after the procedures had
been fully explained, in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki.
ULTIMATUM GAME
Participants completed a total of forty trials of the two-round
Ultimatum Game (van ’t Wout et al., 2010). On each trial, par-
ticipants were ﬁrst shown a picture of their partner with whom
they would be interacting for that round. Pictures of partners
were obtained from a previously used database of undergraduate
students from a different US university (age range 18–30 years,
half of these pictures portrayed a female face; van ’t Wout et al.,
2010). Although we do not have exact demographics of each
face (due to IRB regulations), the faces should closely match
the demographics of the undergraduate sample recruited for this
study.
Participants ﬁrst interacted in the role of responder, i.e., they
received an offer on how a partner wanted to split $10 with
them and they could accept or reject that offer. If the participant
accepted the offer, the money was split as proposed and allocated
accordingly to each player. If the participant rejected the offer,
neither player received any money. Monetary outcomes after the
participant’s decision were shown for both the participant as well
as their partner.
Immediately after the completion of this interaction, partic-
ipants interacted again with this same partner, but this time
the participant was the proposer and thus in the position to
make an offer on how to split $10 with the same partner.
Similar to the ﬁrst interaction, monetary outcomes to both play-
ers were shown immediately after the partner decided to reject
or accept the offer proposed by the participant. The partner’s
response to the participant’s offer was predetermined and based
on close to typical rejection rates of unfair offers. This means
that all $0 were rejected; $1 and $2 offers were rejected 60%
of the time; $3 and $4 offers were rejected 20% of the time;
offers of $5 and higher were always accepted. See Figure 1
for a graphical representation of the two-round Ultimatum
Game.
Participants were told that the offers they would receive as
responders had been collected previously. In reality the range
of offers being presented to participants was: $1, $2, $3, $4,
or $5 out of $10 and was predetermined so that each offer
occurred eight times. To further encourage participants to be
more cognizant of their decisions, they were instructed that
they would play for real money and that a percentage of
the total earnings in the game would be paid out to them.
FIGURE 1 | Full trial of the two-round Ultimatum Game.
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Across the entire game, participants made an additional $5.
Study personnel conﬁrmed before the onset of the Ultimatum
Game that none of the participants had prior experience with
the game.
The 40 two-round Ultimatum Game trials were divided equally
across two blocks of 20 identical trials each. During one twenty
trial block, participants were asked to apply reappraisal when they
received the offer of their partner, whereas during the other block
they could play normally (i.e., baseline). The order of reappraisal
or baselinewas counterbalanced across participants. Out of 30par-
ticipants, 14 performed the baseline ﬁrst-reappraisal second order
and 16 participants completed the reappraisal ﬁrst-baseline sec-
ond order. Participants were given instructions before beginning
any of the trials on how to reappraise. All participants practiced
reappraisal on two mildly negative pictures from the International
Affective Picture System (Lang et al., 1999) and performed two
practice rounds of the Ultimatum Game. Key instructions for
reappraisal can be summarized as follows: “It is very important
to us that you try your best to adopt a neutral attitude as you
watch the offers. To do this, we would like for you to view the
offers with detached interest or try to come up with possible rea-
sons for why someone might give you a certain offer” (see also
van ’t Wout et al., 2010).
After completion of all Ultimatum Game trials, participants
were asked to ﬁll out a debrieﬁng questionnaire. Three questions
about their emotional involvement were asked: (1) how emo-
tionally involved they were while playing the Ultimatum Game
regardless of the offers, (2) how emotionally involved they were
when confronted with unfair offers during the trials in which they
were asked to regulate, and (3) how emotionally involved they
were when confronted with unfair offers during baseline. Answers
were given on a −2 (not at all) to +2 (very much) rating scale.
Additionally, participants reported how likely they thought it was
that they played with a real person on a −2 (not at all) to +2 (very
much) rating scale. Ratings on emotional involvement were com-
pleted after completion of both versions of the Ultimatum Game
(reappraisal and baseline) in order to reduce potential impact of
these questions on participant’s reactions and performance.
INTEROCEPTIVE AWARENESS TASK
Interoceptive awareness was measured by having people estimate
their own heart rate, which we compared to their actual heart
rate. Participants’ heart rate was monitored with a pulse oxime-
ter (PulseOximeterOnline.com) to obtain their average heart rate.
At the same time that their heart rate was measured, participants
were instructed to press a key on the computer keyboard every
time they thought their heart beated. The task ended after 60 key
presses on the keyboard. Accuracy of heart beat detection was cal-
culated using the formula: 1 − (|recorded heart beats − counted
heart beats|)/recorded heart beats (Pollatos et al., 2007a). This
measure allows a range of scores between 0 and 1, with higher
scores indicative of better heart beat detection.
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
The effect of emotion regulation and no regulation (i.e., base-
line) on Ultimatum Game responder behavior, that is rejections
of offers (a binary variable), was analyzed with a generalized
estimating equation (GEE) model. The main reason for the
implementation of a GEE model was that it allows adjusting for
correlations due to repeated (binary) observations within each
participant over the different offers. The Decision to reject (or
accept) was entered as the binary dependent variable. The vari-
ables Offer (four level: $4, $3, $2, $1), Condition (two levels:
reappraisal, baseline), Order (two levels: baseline ﬁrst, reappraisal
ﬁrst) and their two-way and three-way interactions were added as
predictors (factors). The variable Subject was entered as a repeated
effects variable.
For the analysis of offer amount proposed in return (second
Ultimatum Game round), we performed a linear mixed model to
examine the effect of regulation and no regulation on return offers
proposed (a continuous variable) while again taking into account
the repeated and correlated nature of observations within partic-
ipants. The proposed Offer amount in return was the dependent
variable. The following variables were included as ﬁxed effects:
Condition (two levels: baseline, reappraisal), Initial offer in ﬁrst
Ultimatum Game round (ﬁve levels: $5, $4, $3, $2, $1), Deci-
sion of initial offer (two levels: accepted or rejected), and Order
(two levels: baseline ﬁrst, reappraisal ﬁrst) were added as predic-
tors (factors). Additionally, we included the two- and three-way
interactions analogous to the data analyses on proposer behavior.
The variable Subject was entered as a correlated random effects
variable.
Data on emotional involvement (debrieﬁng) was tested using
(paired sample) t-tests. The relationship between heartbeat detec-
tion performance and Ultimatum Game behavior (rejection rates
and return offers) while applying regulation, no regulation or
the difference between regulation and baseline was examined
using multiple regression analyses. The reason for using multi-
ple regression was that we observed a single data point on heart
beat detection accuracy, which was entered as the dependent vari-
able in all regression analyses. Additionally, the use of multiple
regression instead of bivariate correlations reduces the number
of tests performed and thus the likelihood for type I error. In
the regression models for Ultimatum Game responder behavior
(rejection rates), we performed three separate regression analy-
ses. First, we examined whether there was an association between
heart beat detection accuracy (dependent variable) and rejec-
tion rates of unequal offers (four independent variables: rejection
rate for $4, $3, $2, and $1 offers) during baseline. Similarly,
a regression analysis was performed to test for an association
between rejection rates of unequal offers (same four indepen-
dent variables) during reappraisal and interoceptive awareness.
Finally a third regression analyses was performed to test for an
association between interoceptive awareness and the calculated
difference between rejection rates of the four unequal offers dur-
ing reappraisal minus baseline (positive scores suggest higher
acceptance rates during reappraisal relative to baseline). These
three regression analyses were repeated for the analyses of offer
amount returned in the second interaction (proposer behavior).
In these regression analyses heart beat detection accuracy was
again entered as the dependent variable. Return offer amounts
after being confronted with a $4, $3, $2, or $1 offer were entered
as four separate independent variables. Important to note here is
the potential for multicollinearity in these analyses as some of our
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listed independent variables are (highly) correlated. In order to
assess multicollinearity, we measured the Variance Inﬂation Fac-
tor (VIF). A VIF cut-off of ﬁve or greater was interpreted that
collinearity was associated with that variable and we subsequently
removed this variable from the analyses. Data was analyzed using
SPSS v21.
RESULTS
ULTIMATUM GAME: RESPONDER
To conﬁrm the effectiveness of reappraisal on acceptance behav-
ior of participants in this version of the Ultimatum Game, we
ﬁrst performed a GEE model to predict the binary variable rejec-
tion of the received offer by the participant. We ﬁrst added the
variable Offer consisting of four levels: $4, $3, $2, $1 to pre-
dict rejection rate. We excluded $5 offers as these equal offers
were typically almost always accepted (99%). The second variable
we added was Condition with the levels baseline and reappraisal.
A third variable included was the Order in which participants
played the games, i.e., baseline ﬁrst-reappraisal second or reap-
praisal ﬁrst-baseline second. Finally we included the interactions
Offer × Condition, Offer × Order, and Condition × Order as well
as the Offer × Condition × Order interaction.
This analysis resulted in a signiﬁcant main effect for Offer
[F(3,26) = 48.19, p< 0.0001), a signiﬁcant main effect for Condi-
tion [F(1,28) = 4.65, p = 0.03], a non-signiﬁcant main effect for
Order [F(1,28) = 0.01, p = 0.91], a non-signiﬁcant Offer × Con-
dition interaction [F(3,26) = 1.32, p = 0.72], a non-signiﬁcant
Offer × Order interaction [F(3,26) = 1.51, p = 0.68], but a signiﬁ-
cantOrder×Condition interaction [F(1,28)= 12.48, p= 0.0004].
The three-way interaction Offer × Condition × Order interaction
was non-signiﬁcant [F(3,26) = 1.99, p = 0.57].
The main effect for Offer was due to acceptance rates declin-
ing as offers became more unfair: M$4 = 0.79 (SE = 0.06),
M$3 = 0.50 (SE = 0.08); M$2 = 0.35 (SE = 0.07); and M$1 = 0.25
(SE = 0.06). This replicates the pattern of rejection rates docu-
mented for responders in the Ultimatum Game (Camerer, 2003;
Sanfey et al., 2003; Harlé et al., 2010; van ’t Wout et al., 2010).
The main effect for Condition showed that participants accepted
unfair offers more often after reappraisal (M = 0.52, SE = 0.07) as
compared to no regulation (baseline: M = 0.43, SE = 0.07). The
non-signiﬁcant main effect for Order demonstrated that across
the two order groups (baseline ﬁrst or reappraisal ﬁrst) there
was no difference on acceptance rates, namely Mbaseline ﬁrst 0.47
(SE = 0.10) and Mreappraisal ﬁrst 0.48 (SE = 0.09).
The non-signiﬁcant Offer × Condition interaction showed
that acceptance rates declined as offers became less fair in both
the baseline as well as the reappraisal condition, see Figure 2.
Similarly the non-signiﬁcant Offer × Order interaction revealed
that acceptance rates declined as offers became less fair regard-
less of whether participants played baseline ﬁrst or reappraisal
ﬁrst, see Figure 2. Finally the Order × Condition interaction was
signiﬁcant due to a larger difference in accepting unfair offers dur-
ing reappraisal as compared to baseline in participants who ﬁrst
played during baseline and reappraisal second [Mbaseline = 0.36
(SE = 0.08) and Mreappraisal = 0.58 (SE = 0.11)]. In contrast,
those who reappraised ﬁrst and then performed under baseline
showed a smaller difference in acceptance rates between conditions
FIGURE 2 | Acceptance rates of offers (including fair offers for graphing
purposes) subdivided by regulation condition (baseline or reappraisal)
and order of regulation (“baseline first” or “reappraisal first”).
[Mreappraisal = 0.45 (SE = 0.09) and Mbaseline = 0.51 (SE = 0.10)],
see Figure 2. Indeed, the effect of reappraisal on acceptance rates
was signiﬁcant when selecting only those participants who played
baseline ﬁrst and reappraisal second (paired sample t = −3.04,
df = 13, p = 0.01). For those participants who played reappraisal
ﬁrst and baseline second, the effect of reappraisal on acceptance
behavior was non-signiﬁcant (paired sample t = 1.00, df = 15,
p = 0.33).
ULTIMATUM GAME: PROPOSER
To test whether there was an effect of reappraisal on return offers
made by participants in the second part of the Ultimatum Game,
we performed a linear mixed model to predict return offer pro-
posed by participants. We used a linear mixed model to allow for
repeated measurements (i.e., multiple Ultimatum Game trials)
per participant. We included the following predictors: Condition
(Baseline or Reappraisal) to test whether regulation affects return
offers beyond the initial interaction; Initial offer received when
acting as responder ($5, $4, $3, $2, $1), as we expected that par-
ticipants would propose lower return offers after being treated
more unfairly; Decision of initial offer (accepted or rejected),
based on the hypothesis that rejected initial offers would result
in higher return offers than accepted initial offers (van ’t Wout
et al., 2010); Order (baseline ﬁrst-reappraisal second or reappraisal
second-baseline ﬁrst), to examine whether the effect of playing
while applying reappraisal ﬁrst or second might inﬂuence return
offers. We further included the analogous interaction terms as
those added to the analysis on responder data, namely the two-
way interactions Initial offer × Condition, Initial offer × Order
andCondition×Order, and the Initial offer×Condition×Order
three-way interaction.
This analysis showed a signiﬁcant main effect for Condition
[F(1,1151.94) = 5.36, p = 0.02] suggesting that participants
proposed a higher return offer after they applied reappraisal
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FIGURE 3 | Return offer proposed by participant as a function of initial
offer received and regulation condition (baseline or reappraisal).
[Mreappraisal = 4.02 (SE = 0.12)] during a previous interaction
with the same person as compared to baseline [M rmbaseline = 3.83
(SE = 0.12)]. The main effect for Initial offer was also signiﬁcant
[F(4,1160.08) = 29.84, p < 0.0001] demonstrating that return
offers were lower when initial offers were less fair, see Figure 3.
We further observed a signiﬁcant main effect of Decision [F(1,
1133.73 = 12.54, p < 0.0001] suggesting that participants pro-
posed higher return offers after they had rejected (as compared to
accepted) their partners’ initial offer previously, Mrejected = 4.14
(SE = 0.13) and Maccepted = 3.72 (SE = 0.12). The main effect of
Order was not signiﬁcant [F(1,27.99) = 1.96, p = 0.17] suggesting
that average return offers were comparable across the “baseline
ﬁrst” and “reappraisal ﬁrst” groups.
The interaction between Initial offer × Condition was non-
signiﬁcant [F(4,1151.16) = 0.87, p = 0.48] suggesting that return
offer amount declined as initial offers were less fair in both the
baseline as well as the reappraisal condition. The interaction Ini-
tial offer × Order was also non-signiﬁcant [F(4,1151.14) = 0.17,
p = 0.96] demonstrating that return offer amount declined as ini-
tial offers were less fair regardless of whether participants played
baseline ﬁrst or reappraisal ﬁrst. The Condition × Order interac-
tion was signiﬁcant [F(1,1153.38) = 4.22, p = 0.04]. Data showed
that there was a larger difference in return offer amount dur-
ing reappraisal as compared to baseline in participants who ﬁrst
played during reappraisal and baseline second [Mbaseline = 3.57
(SE = 0.08) and Mreappraisal = 3.91 (SE = 0.09)]. In contrast,
those who performed under baseline ﬁrst and reappraised sec-
ond showed a smaller difference in return offer amount between
conditions [Mreappraisal = 4.03 (SE = 0.07) and Mbaseline = 4.07
(SE = 0.08)]. The three-way interaction Initial offer × Con-
dition × Order was non-signiﬁcant [F(4,115.14) = 0.51,
p = 0.73].
DEBRIEFING
Participants reported to be only somewhat emotionally involved
while playing the Ultimatum Game (regardless of offer),M = 0.17
(SE = 0.24) on a −2 (not all emotionally involved) to +2 (very
emotionally involved) scale. Participants reported to be less emo-
tionally involved when confronted with unfair offers during trials
in which they were asked to reappraise as compared to their emo-
tional involvement during baseline trials, Mreappraisal = −0.73,
Mbaseline = 0.07, paired sample t-test = −2.89, df = 29, p = 0.007.
Given that we observed an interaction between Condition and
Order on Ultimatum Game acceptance rates, we tested whether
playing baseline or reappraisal ﬁrst affected emotional involve-
ment in the game. There was a trend for participants who
played baseline ﬁrst to be more emotionally involved in the game
[M = 0.53 (SE = 0.27)] as compared to those who played reap-
praisal ﬁrst [M = −0.27 (SE = 0.37)], t-test = 1.73, df = 28,
p = 0.09.
With respect to whether participants thought their partners
were real, 10% (N = 3) of participants thought their partners
were not at all real (−2 on rating scale); 27% (N = 8) of partici-
pants reported that their partners were most likely not real (−1 on
rating scale); 20% (N = 6) reported that they were not sure about
whether their partner was real or not (0 on rating scale); 23%
(N = 7) thought their partner is most likely real (+1 on rating
scale) and 20% (N = 6) of participants reported that they thought
their partner for sure was real (+2 on rating scale).
INTEROCEPTIVE AWARENESS
Average heart rate recorded was 74.95 beats/min (SD = 12.76).
The average number of taps on the keyboard in order to estimate
heartbeat by participants was 55.92 taps/min (SD = 19.97). The
mean calculated heartbeat detection score was 0.66 (SD = 0.21)
with a range between 0.28 and 0.98.
INTEROCEPTIVE AWARENESS AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH
ULTIMATUM GAME BEHAVIOR AND HABITUAL REGULATION
As mentioned in the analysis section, we tested the presence of an
association between interoceptive awareness and rejection rates
of unfair offers (<$5) during different Ultimatum Game condi-
tions using multiple regression analyses. Results did not support
a relationship between interoceptive ability and acceptance rates
during baseline (all p’s> 0.13). Similarly,multiple regression anal-
ysis did not support a relationship between interoceptive ability
and acceptance rates during reappraisal (all p’s > 0.14). How-
ever, VIF analyses demonstrated the presence of multicollinearity
(VIF statistic: 5.32) for the predictor “rejection rate of $2 offers
during reappraisal.” A regression analysis without this predictor
(i.e., remaining three predictors were rejection rates of $4, $3,
and $1 offers during reappraisal) resulted in a positive relation-
ship between interoceptive ability and rejection rate of $1 offers
during reappraisal, β = 0.48, t(23) = 2.23, p = 0.04. To directly
test whether there was a relationship between interoceptive ability
and difference in acceptance rates due to reappraisal relative to
baseline, we calculated a “regulation difference score” by subtract-
ing acceptance rates during baseline from acceptance rates during
reappraisal. Positive scores suggest higher acceptance rates dur-
ing reappraisal relative to baseline. When looking at the speciﬁc
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predictors, we observed a negative relationship between intero-
ceptive ability and regulation difference score for $4 offers only,
β = −0.47, t(23) = −2.59, p = 0.02. For all other unfair offers
ps> 0.46. The signiﬁcant associationbetween interoceptive aware-
ness and increased acceptance of $4 offers during reappraisal com-
pared to baseline is based on 10 participants who actually showed
a difference in acceptance behavior due to regulation. Therefore
this observed association needs to be interpreted with extreme
caution.
We repeated these three regression analyses to test the relation-
ship between interoceptive awareness and return offers during (1)
baseline, (2) reappraisal, and (3) reappraisal relative to baseline.
Reappraisal relative to baseline was examined using a regulation
difference score for return offers in which positive scores sug-
gest higher return offers after reappraisal compared to baseline.
In all of these three regression analyses, a signiﬁcant association
between interoceptive awareness and return offers proposed was
not observed (all p’s> 0.15).
Using linear regression, we tested whether there was a rela-
tionship between interoceptive ability and emotional involve-
ment while playing the Ultimatum Game during baseline and
reappraisal. This was non-signiﬁcant for baseline (p = 0.75).
The relationship between interoceptive awareness and emo-
tional involvement during reappraisal approached signiﬁcance
[β = −0.34, t(25) = −1.73, p = 0.09]. This suggests that
those who had better interoceptive awareness tend to report
less emotional involvement in the game when they applied
reappraisal.
Finally, we tested whether heartbeat detection accuracy was
correlated with the self-reported habitual use of two regulation
techniques: reappraisal and suppression, as measured with the
ERQ. A linear regression in which the two regulation styles (reap-
praisal and suppression) were added to predict heartbeat detection
accuracy demonstrated that the use of suppression did not signif-
icantly predict interoceptive awareness [β = 0.03, t(25) = 0.17,
p = 0.86]. Reappraisal on the other hand seemed to signiﬁcantly
predict interoceptive awareness [β= 0.41, t(25) = 2.21, p = 0.03].
However these results seem to be explained by an outlier on the
ERQ and when removing this data point from the analyses the
results are no longer signiﬁcant (ps > 0.28). Other factors such
as behavior on the Ultimatum Game, whether it being acceptance
rates or return offers, were not signiﬁcantly related to reappraisal
or suppression on the ERQ as tested using a linear regression
approach (all p’s> 0.46).
DISCUSSION
In this studywe aimed to examinewhether peoplewho are better at
interoceptive awareness were better at regulating unfair treatment
by others in a social interactive decision-making context, i.e., the
UltimatumGame. This hypothesiswas basedon the idea that being
aware of one’s emotions is essential for the regulationof these emo-
tions. Interoceptive awareness was quantiﬁed using a commonly-
used heartbeat detection task in which participants were asked to
approximatewhen their heartwas beating (Schandry,1981). Regu-
lation was accomplished by providing instructions to participants
b how they could reappraise an emotional reaction in response
to unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game. Reappraisal success was
based on (1) increased acceptance rates of unfair offers during
reappraisal as compared to baseline when participants played in
the role of responder in the ﬁrst part of the two-round Ultimatum
Game, and (2) higher monetary return offers when interacting in
the role of proposer after participants applied reappraisal as com-
pared to baseline in the second part of the two-round Ultimatum
Game.
First, it was important to show that we were able to replicate
ourpreviousﬁndings of increasing acceptance rates of unfair offers
when participants were asked to reappraise an emotional reaction
to such offers in this Ultimatum Game compared to no reappraisal
(van ’t Wout et al., 2010). We were also able to replicate the typi-
cal ﬁnding of a decline in acceptance rates as offers became more
unfair (Camerer, 2003; Sanfey et al., 2003). This is important as
acceptance rates may be inﬂuenced by the knowledge that people
will interact again with the same person, albeit in a different role,
in this two-round Ultimatum Game. Acceptance rates appeared
to be rather similar to other studies using a standard Ultimatum
Game (Harlé et al., 2010), but potentially somewhat lower (Sanfey
et al., 2003; Koenigs and Tranel, 2007). In both the baseline and
reappraisal condition, acceptance rates decreased as offers became
less fair. This pattern was not affected by whether participants
played baseline ﬁrst or reappraisal ﬁrst. We did however ﬁnd that
participants who played the game while applying reappraisal ﬁrst
(and baseline second) accepted unfair offers to the same degree
regardless of whether they applied reappraisal or not (i.e., base-
line). Participants in the “baseline-ﬁrst” group on the other hand
did show a signiﬁcant difference in acceptance rates after they
applied reappraisal as compared to no reappraisal. One possible
explanation for this ﬁnding might be a combination of (1) partic-
ipants who ﬁrst played the game while applying reappraisal may
have continued doing this to some extent while playing baseline
the second time, and (2) experience with the game, i.e., playing
the game twice, may result in reduced affective responses to unfair
offers and subsequent increased acceptance rates. For instance, we
observed a trend for participants who played reappraisal ﬁrst to
be less emotionally involved in the game as compared to those
who played baseline ﬁrst. Such a reduction in emotional involve-
ment when playing the game for the second time might make
reappraisal all the more effective for those in the “baseline-ﬁrst”
group, as the to-be-regulated responses might be less intense and
which could have facilitate the effect of reappraisal. We did not
observe a three-way interaction between order, offer amount and
condition.
We further replicated the effect of increased return offers after
reappraisal as compared to baseline in a second interaction with
the same partner (van ’t Wout et al., 2010). Additionally, we repli-
cated the effects of larger return offers after initially proposed
offers were rejected as compared to accepted. Finally, we repli-
cated the observation that participants proposed larger return
offers to their partners if partners had initially proposed a more
fair distribution of the sum. A surprising ﬁnding was the signif-
icant Condition × Order interaction showing a larger difference
in return offer amount during reappraisal as compared to baseline
in participants who ﬁrst played during reappraisal and baseline
second. In contrast, those who performed under baseline ﬁrst
and reappraised second showed a smaller difference in return
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offer amount between conditions. This is opposite from what
we demonstrated for responder behavior, i.e., participants who
ﬁrst played baseline and reappraisal second showed a larger dif-
ference in acceptance rates during reappraisal as compared to
baseline. Furthermore, when looking at the means of the Con-
dition × Order interaction for return offers one notices that the
return offers are numerically higher for the “baseline ﬁrst” group
both during baseline as well as reappraisal. It should however be
noticed that the main effect of Order on return offer amount was
non-signiﬁcant. Besides this last unexpected interaction, our data
on rejection rates and return offers during reappraisal as compared
to baseline mostly replicated the effect of emotion regulation on
Ultimatum Game behavior (van ’t Wout et al., 2010). The regu-
latory mechanism is most likely due to a reduction in (negative)
feelings associatedwith unfair treatment. This is further supported
by our ﬁnding of reductions in emotional involvement during
reappraisal as compared to baseline.
With respect to interoceptive awareness and regulation, the
main goal of this study, we observed a trend for participants
with better heartbeat detection accuracy to report less emotional
involvement while applying reappraisal during the game. This is in
line with our hypothesis as we had predicted that those with better
interoceptive awareness would be better at regulating their emo-
tions, which should result in a reduction of subjective (negative)
affect (Füstös et al., 2012). We however did not observe an associ-
ation between interoceptive awareness and differential Ultimatum
Gamebehavior during reappraisal as compared tobaseline. Intero-
ceptive awareness was also not associated with baseline Ultimatum
Game acceptance rates. After removal of one variable due to mul-
ticollinearity in the analysis, we observed a positive association
between interoceptive awareness and acceptance rate of the most
unfair offer ($1) during reappraisal. This suggests that people with
better interoceptive awareness accept more very unfair offers ($1)
during reappraisal. This result needs to be interpreted with cau-
tion due to the presence of multicollinearity in the full regression
model.
We did not observe signiﬁcant relationships between intero-
ceptive awareness and return offers made in the second round
of the two-round Ultimatum Game, whether this was during
baseline, reappraisal, or the difference between reappraisal and
baseline. These data suggest that interoceptive abilities did not
predict reappraisal success in order to change their behavior in a
social interactive context. After removing an outlier, we also did
not observe a signiﬁcant association between interoceptive aware-
ness and self-reported daily use of reappraisal or suppression. This
is further evidence that people with better interoceptive abilities
do not necessarily apply regulatory strategies more often in their
everyday life.
Previous research demonstrated an association between inte-
roceptive awareness and cognitive functions including decision
making in the Ultimatum Game (Dunn et al., 2010) and self-
regulation during physical exercise (Pollatos et al., 2007a). More
speciﬁcally, the relationship between arousal (skin conductance)
in response to offers and the rejection of offers was moderated by
interoceptive accuracy (Dunn et al., 2012). These ﬁndings high-
light that the relationship between interoceptive awareness and
social interactive decision-making is not a simple one. We did
not examine psychophysiological variables, such as skin conduc-
tance, when confronted with (unfair) offers during reappraisal
and baseline. The addition of such measures would have allowed
examination of biological markers of bodily arousal in response
to offers in the game and which have been modulated by reap-
praisal. Based on previous studies, it may actually be changes in
these bodily responses due to reappraisal of the Ultimatum Game
that could be mediated by interoceptive ability (Dunn et al., 2012).
Our aim was to examine the potential association between
interoceptive awareness and emotion regulation abilities in inter-
personal decision-making. The explicit instructions provided to
participants on how to apply emotion regulation might have
obscured the potentially subtle association between interoceptive
awareness and emotion regulation capabilities in such a social
context. Moreover, feedback provided to participants from the
decisions made in the game could have further resulted in dif-
ﬁculties with observing more subtle inﬂuences of interoceptive
ability on emotion regulation in the Ultimatum Game. It should
be noted however that heightened interoceptive sensitivity has also
been associated with symptoms of anxiety (Pollatos et al., 2007b;
Domschke et al., 2010), which in turn is associated with reduced
emotion regulation capacity (Suveg and Zeman, 2004). Thus,
the association between interoceptive awareness and emotion
regulation might follow a reverse U-shaped function.
As is often the case with null results, there is the potential that
our study is underpowered. A lack of power reduces the gener-
alizability of the results, could result in both type I and II errors
and should therefore be taken serious. Our sample of 28 par-
ticipants is on the smaller end of the spectrum and this is an
important limitation. Nevertheless, Füstös et al. (2012) report data
on 28 participants of a relationship between psychophysiological
measures during regulation and interoceptive awareness. In addi-
tion, we succeeded in replicating previous ﬁndings of the effects of
reappraisal on Ultimatum Game responder and proposer behav-
ior using the same task in a different group of participants. This
suggests we are not underpowered to detect changes due to regu-
lation on Ultimatum Game behavior. Nonetheless, we might have
been underpowered to detect a more subtle association between
regulation and interoceptive awareness and the lack of signiﬁcant
ﬁndings should be interpreted cautiously.
Other limitations of this study are that a portion of our partic-
ipants report that they did not take the computerized interactions
in the Ultimatum Game as real social interactions, which could
have inﬂuenced our data. However given that we explicitly men-
tioned that people would receive additional money based on the
decisions made in the game, one would expect that if partici-
pants were not engaged by the social nature of the game, they
would accept more, if not all, unfair offers. Instead, acceptance
rates declined as offers became more unfair, which is in line with
data typically observed in the Ultimatum Game (Camerer, 2003).
An additional limitation is the implementation of a heart beat
detection task to measure interoceptive awareness. It has been
acknowledged before that awareness of heartbeat alone might be
an incomplete indexof interoceptive awareness (Khalsa et al., 2008;
Mehling et al., 2012). We also did not measure aspects that could
have inﬂuenced heartbeat detection such as body mass (Rouse
et al., 1988; Cameron, 2001) or screened people on heart rhythm
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abnormalities. Furthermore, we provided limited practice with
heartbeat detection and the application of reappraisal. Heart-
beat detection accuracy is rather low, although within the range
of reported ﬁndings on such a task (Pollatos et al., 2005). We
believe that more practice with heart-beat detection, the applica-
tionof reappraisal, amore extensive quantiﬁcationof interoceptive
awareness including psychophysiology, and an even more realistic
social interactive decision-making context may provide different
results. Because of the preliminary nature of this study, results
should be interpreted with caution, and as with any scientiﬁc
result, replication is needed. The investigation of an association
between the awareness of bodily states and self-regulation in a
social context is important for the generation and application
of treatment options for psychiatric phenomena including social
anxiety and those with regulation difﬁculties such as aggression
and alexithymia.
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